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ABSTRACT 
Truxen is a Trusted Computing enhanced blockchain that uses Proof of Integrity 
protocol as the consensus. Proof of Integrity protocol is derived from Trusted 
Computing and associated Remote Attestations, that can be used to vouch a node’s 
identity and integrity to all of the other nodes in the blockchain network. In this paper 
we describe how Trusted Computing and Proof of Integrity can be used to enhance 
blockchain in the areas of mining block, executing transaction and smart contract, 
protecting sensitive data. Truxen presents a Single Execution Model, that can verify 
and execute transaction and smart contract in a solo node, consequently enables 
remote calls to off-chain applications and performs in-deterministic tasks. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Blockchain was introduced with bitcoin which is an implementation of Satoshi’s 
paper Bitcoin: A peer-to-peer electronic cash system. Bitcoin is a so-called 
decentralized ledger, whose data is opened to everyone holding the ledger, and it does 
not rely on a central system to maintain the account balances and transactions. The 
decentralized ledger allows users to hold cash by trusting the cryptographic 
algorithms rather than trusting authorities like banks. 
However, blockchain goes beyond the scope of cash, its character of un-shadowing 
any transactions enable great potential use scenarios, for example, finance, supply 
chain, legal evidence and digital assets, especially the domains without trust 
substantially. On the other hand, blockchain is used in the hostile environment in most 
cases, where adversaries’ attacks and malwares occur frequently. So, some methods 
and algorithms are used to reach consensus, such as mining blocks to preserve 
transactions, ECDSA signing to prevent forged transactions, executing transaction 
individually to calculate results without trust anyone, etc. Some of these methods and 
algorithms are complex and low efficient, which restrict increasing the throughput and 
protecting the sensitive data.  
Trusted Computing can be used within blockchain to reach consensus straightforward, 
which mitigates the heavy dependency on hash style mining jobs, and reduces 
redundant transactions execution. In the meantime, Trusted Computing can be used to 
protect the credentials, keys, and other personal sensitive data in blockchain.  
Our contribution in this paper are as follows: 
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⚫ We present a Proof of Integrity protocol with Trusted Computing enhancement 
for blockchain, that can reduce the consensus complexity. Trusted Computing 
seals the identity and integrity that cannot be forged, so the mining process will 
defend the Sybil, and PoW, PoS, DPoS are not required any more. 
⚫ We present a Single Execution Model that allows the transactions and smart 
contracts are executed on one node only, distributed execution is no longer 
required to resolve blockchain’s efficiency problem. 
⚫ We present an approach under the Single Execution Model allowing off-chain 
invocation and in-deterministic computing, that are missing from other 
blockchains. Off-chain invocation and in-deterministic computing are critical 
when introducing blockchain into enterprise application. 
Truxen uses the features of Trusted Computing to enhance the blockchain efficiently 
and is described in the following sections. We also provide a reference code base 
(https://github.com/truxen-org/chainpoc) for proof of concept. 
2. TRUSTED COMPUTING 
Trusted Computing is a set of specifications proposed by TCG, and it’s widely used in 
many scenarios, like platform integrity check, digital rights management, disk 
encryption, IoT data protection and critical applications restraint. With the enablement 
of Trusted Computing, a system will behave consistently in expected ways, and its 
behaviors will be enforced by combination of hardware and software [18]. Trusted 
Computing employs a hardware module as a secure crypto processor, named Trusted 
Platform Module (TPM), to accomplish the unique tasks of Trusted Computing 
protocols. TCG defines four types of TPM: discrete TPM, integrate TPM, firmware 
TPM and software TPM, and offers different secure level, among which discrete TPM 
is the first level and is adopted by Truxen. So, in this paper, terms Trusted Platform 
Module and TPM are regarded as discrete one, but other types can also work. 
Trusted Platform Module integrates a set of cryptographic algorithms, seals 
cryptographic keys, and offers the facilities to Trusted Computing protocols, e.g. 
measuring the platform integrity, generating integrity reports, signing data and 
encrypting sensitive information. These processes run inside the TPM chip and are 
separated from the other parts of a system. Any malicious code tampering to the 
system does no impact the execution environment within TPM. Detailed protocol 
specifications are in Trusted Computing Group’s documentation [4][17]. Figure 1 is a 
reference physical architecture of Trusted Platform Module.  
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Figure 1: Trusted Platform Module Components 
2.1 Integrity Measurement 
Integrity measurement is the key feature of Trusted Computing. It starts on Root of 
Trust for Measurement (RTM). The Root of Trust for Measurement is the root of 
controlled measurement of the integrity of a system, and is followed by 3 levels 
measurement in the order: static measurement, dynamic measurement and integrity 
measurement architecture.  
When the system is reset, it starts to execute the static integrity measurement before 
any firmware and application startup, and the static measurement generates integrity 
values of firmware and bootloader that represents the pre-boot state of the platform. 
Next, the dynamic measurement takes over the measurement of loading the system 
kernel. Intel TXT technology is a typical implement of dynamic measurement. Finally, 
the integrity measurement architecture (IMA) measures the applications, libraries and 
modules on the top during each of these components starts to run. These integrity 
values are hashed and extended into several shielded registers in Root of Trust for 
Storage, called PCRs, which cannot be modified from outside in order to resist the 
adversaries. In the meantime, PCR event logs are recorded as well. These event log 
entries contain the PCR number, the value that was extended into the PCR and a log 
message (giving details what was measured). The messages could be used to track 
every measurement step and inspect each of the firmware, kernel and applications 
running on host. Verifier can verify the logs consistency by re-calculating the PCR 
value from the logs and compare with the original value. 
Root of Trust for Reporting can read the PCRs value, and then digitally signs the 
value with its private attestation signing key inside TPM.  The signed PCRs value 
can be sent out to remote node to vouch for its integrity. The private attestation 
signing key is encrypted by Root of Trust for Storage key within hardware, which 
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never leave the hardware [31], therefore, nobody can get the key to prevent the 
signature from forging. However, attestation signing key may also be used to sign any 
data from outside for general purposes, so the values of internal state consistently start 
with a special flag TPM_GENERATED_VALUE to ensure they are from inside 
Trusted Platform Module. Any external value with this flag will be refused to 
generate signature to prevent forging reporting data. 
The integrity measurement flows as following steps:  
1) An integrity measurement process retrieves the firmware, kernel and applications 
packages during starting up, calculates hash values and appends them into TPM 
PCRs one by one. Any changes to the codes and packages will result in a different 
measurement value. 
2) A reporting process collects the measurement values from PCRs and signs the 
values with the attestation signing key to generate the Attestation Quote. This 
process is restricted inside the Trusted Platform Module and nobody can forge the 
PCRs and signatures.  
3) The Attestation Quote and Attestation Key Identity Certification are composed as 
Integrity Report and sent to remote sites to vouch for its integrity. Attestation Key 
Identity Certification is a type of certificate and is issued by a third party such as 
an attestation Certificate Authority (CA), in order to prove the specific attestation 
signing key is linked with it. Attestation Key Identity Certification is public to all 
others, and is usually used to verify the signature in Attestation Quote from the 
TPM. 
The Integrity Measurement runs on the local system, and the core part run within 
TPM. The Integrity Report is measurement result, with which the remote site is able 
to determine if it’s running on the predefined way through Remote Attestation.  
2.2 Remote Attestation 
Remote site who will cooperate with the vouching site needs to evaluate the Integrity 
Report and determine an appropriate response or action. Remote site validates 
Attestation Key Identity Certification first to check if it is issued by a trusted third 
party and linked with a genuine TPM. In a well-organized consortium, Attestation 
Key Identity Certification is issued if and only if its attestation signing key truly 
resides in the genuine TPM. A TPM Endorsement Key (EK) helps to provide the 
residency evidence [4]. Secondly, remote site verifies the Attestation Quote to check 
if the integrity value (PCR) is correct and the signature is really signed by this TPM. 
If all of these are inerrant, the system is regard as honest and not tampered. 
Attestation Key Identity Certification can be generated and used under a so-called 
Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) architecture which is proposed in TCG 
specifications. The certification is randomized by the TPM and the host platform 
before they are sent to the remote sites in order to keep the privacy of the identity. It 
provides two modes of signatures, anonymous and pseudonymous. The former means 
different signatures from the same signer cannot be correlated, and the latter means 
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different signatures from the same signer can be correlated but the identity of the 
signer is still unknown. Detailed information and algorithm can be found in 
[4][35][38]. 
It depends on the business requirement to use DAA or not. If the privacy is not a 
concern, e.g. in Truxen, a simple attestation is straightforward and good enough, 
otherwise DAA architecture need be setup and followed.  
3. BLOCKCHAIN ENHANCEMENT 
Trusted Computing has strong capability to resist the malicious codes and attacks 
against adversaries, consequently, all codes, data and functions in such a platform can 
be trustworthy and consistent. In this section, we leverage Trusted Computing to 
enhance blockchain in order to reduce the blockchain consensus complexity, and 
increase the performance, efficiency and security. Finally, we present an innovative 
Single Execution Model for blockchain.  
The mining process implemented with Trusted Computing reduces the complexity of 
consensus work, because all miner nodes can provide evidence (Integrity Report) that 
they are enforced to be honest and never submit an invalid block or collude to tamper 
the historical transactions and balances. The transactions executed by a miner are 
sufficiently trusted to all the other nodes, no more executions are required, as a 
consequence, the load in a node is decreased. The result of smart contract calculated 
by a miner is safe to be persisted into local chain storage in each node. The random 
number generator with an entropy source inside the TPM can create the true 
randomness to be used for in-determined purpose, e.g. seed generation and sortition. 
The sensitive data, like private keys, are encrypted with the storage key by TPM, then 
stored securely in the system storage. We discuss these details from the next section. 
3.1 Enhance Mining Process 
PoW mining algorithm is widely adopted since the beginning of bitcoin, and 
demonstrate its security ability in the wild during 9 years. It’s simple and 
sophisticated, which almost 80% of the cryptocurrencies are utilizing as mining 
consensus. PoW is low efficient as it consumes a large number of electricity to do the 
hash calculating on each of miners. 
However, PoW is a good approach to resist Sybil attack, that is a major issue in the 
decentralized environment, as public blockchain is totally open to anyone in the 
internet without any membership control. The only way attackers could launch 
effective Sybil attacks is to occupy a big number of mining machines, that would cost 
thousands of millions of money. 
The alternative mining algorithm are PoS, DPos, Byzantine Fault Tolerance, PoA, 
PoP [32], etc., but none of them has the ability to balance the performance, 
decentralization, efficiency, fairness and operability. There are a lot of research 
articles on these terms, and detailed discussion is beyond the scope of this paper.  
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In this section, we propose a Trusted Computing based mining. The mining node on 
such a base can be regarded as honest and the consensus can be reached concisely, 
therefore the complexity of mining would be reduced as following reasons: 
1) Honest node works as design consistently, nobody can tamper the behavior and 
deviate the consensus algorithms. Any unpermitted change on the mining node 
will result in the failure of remote attestation, subsequently the blocks produced 
by this node will be ignored and eliminated by others from the blockchain 
network.  
2) The miner electing process can be either round-robin or randomized approaches. 
It is realizable because every Trusted Computing enhanced node have a unique 
identity which cannot be forged to resist Sybil, comparing to PoA whose identity 
is stored in a file system that is forgeable and less secure. The round-robin or 
randomized is quite fair to each miner, no matter how many CPU cores, 
memories, storages and bandwidths it has. On the other hand, the algorithm can 
be tweaked to have some weight factor, e.g. some specific miners have more 
opportunity to produce blocks if they are living for a longer time. This electing 
process does not act as the competitiveness approach like PoW/PoS, and 
mitigates the fork and uncle issues on chain. The fork and uncle issues lead to the 
on-chain transactional data inconsistent as the time goes on until a certain number 
of blocks are appended after these data. 
3) The new block received by a node could be appended to the local chain without 
executing the transactions, if and when the remote attestation is passed. This can 
decrease computing effort in a node when blocks arrive at a high frequency 
(initial downloading bulky blocks is at such a high frequency when a new 
blockchain client starts, CPU rate is up to around 100% as it executes 
transactions intensively), so it increases the performance in each node. More 
details are illustrated in section Enhance the Performance of Blockchain. 
4) Majority attack is impossible. 51% hash rate would revise the bitcoin transactions 
history to cause the double spending problem, but it’s impossible in Trusted 
Computing approach because there is no way to change the behavior of the nodes 
protected by Trusted Computing. 
The mining algorithm is very flexible, and most security problems are resolved by 
Trusted Computing, decreasing the dependent on software cryptographic algorithm. 
Intel created a PoET [33] mining protocol in the Sawtooth project in conjunction with 
Intel SGX capability, which is used to elect the miner by waiting a verifiable random 
time, shortest waiting time is the winner. Microsoft released a whitepaper on a Coco 
Framework [34], which enables high-scale, confidential blockchain networks using 
Intel’s SGX and Windows Virtual Secure Mode (VSM). In this paper we propose a 
novel protocol: Proof of Integrity. 
3.2 Proof of Integrity Protocol 
Proof of Integrity Protocol is our major contribution in this paper, it has several 
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processes to reach a consensus among all of the blockchain participants. The miner 
join process checks if a new miner is eligible to join the blockchain and mine. The 
miner must show their identity and integrity, then others will check if the certificate of 
identity is issued and signed by an authority, and the integrity value is within a 
predefined list. The miner electing process can be either round-robin or randomized, 
one miner is elected at a specific round according to the electing algorithm to produce 
a block.  
3.2.1 Notions 
Miner is a node with Trusted Computing enhancement to produce blocks in 
blockchain network. In most cases, Trusted Computing refers as a computer with 
TPM. Miner has an identity sealed inside the TPM, and a public certificate to show 
others that it truly has this identity. The identity can be the attestation signing key or 
the endorsement key, and the certificate must be issued and signed by an authority 
(issuer), e.g. the CA. The miner can provide evidence of its system integrity (Integrity 
Report) to remote nodes to vouch that it’s running consistently and honestly without 
any modification and tampering. 
Miner List is a list containing all of the valid miners’ labels and certificates. A new 
miner will be added into this list when it passes the miner join process. The miner list 
is located on each of the blockchain node, and it is used to decide which miner is 
responsible to produce a block at the specific round. 
Integrity is a value of system integrity through measurement. The measurement 
happens when system starts up, include the hardware, firmware, OS kernel, module 
and applications. The Integrity values are persisted in PCRs inside the TPM module, 
nobody can modify or forge them. The quote command can retrieve them with an 
identity signature. 
Integrity List is a list containing all of the valid integrity values, and is located on 
each of the blockchain nodes. The miner whose integrity value falls in the list should 
be regard as honest. 
3.2.2 Miner Join Method 
When a new miner joins the blockchain network, other nodes will check its 
qualification and determine the acceptance. The miner join method is as following 
steps. 
1) A new miner sends a join request to blockchain network. The request contains an 
Integrity Report which is consist of identity certificate and Attestation Quote 
(quoted integrity values).  
2) The active miner for the next round adds the request into a block. So, other nodes 
can retrieve the request as soon as they get the block, and if a node starts from 
scratch, it can restore all joined miners after traversing the blocks from the genesis 
to the latest. 
3) Other nodes who get the request from the block, verify the requester’s identity 
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certificate to determine if it is issued by an authorized issuer. This requires the 
nodes have the issuers’ metadata, for example, CA’s root cert or intermedia cert. 
4) Other nodes verify the Attestation Quote. This requires the nodes to check the 
integrity values and the signature. The integrity values must fall in the integrity 
list, and the signature must be signed by requester’s identity that can be verified 
with identity certificate.  
5) Other nodes add this miner into its miner list.  
Step 3 and 4 are strong constraint in miner join process, as the malicious miner cannot 
forge the identity, identity certificate and Attestation Quote. The identity (attestation 
signing key) is encrypted and sealed inside the TPM, and there is no way to reveal 
and copy the key. The identity certificate is derived from the identity and signed by 
the authority. Attestation Quote proves the integrity value is truly from the specific 
TPM without any modification.  
3.2.3 Miner Electing Method 
The principle of miner electing is controlled by the blockchain consensus, which 
directs the nodes whether or not they should accept a miner’s block at a certain round. 
The original consensus mechanism by Satoshi Nakamoto is one CPU one vote, and 
every CPU has the same probability to produce blocks. So, the PoW was born when 
Bitcoin was created. Substantially, Satoshi’s consensus is to associate a miner with a 
hardware to defend the sybil attack, as the hardware is costly to be replicated for 
gaining higher possibility of being elected. The PoS is running the same rule, it 
associates miner’s money with the possibility of being elected.  
Combining miner’s identity with the hardware is an alternative approach to defend the 
sybil attacks as long as the hardware can prevent the identity from being forged. 
Trusted Computing seals the miner’s identity inside the TPM, that makes each of the 
miner unique and unforgeable among the blockchain participants.  
Unlike the consensuses without finality, e.g. PoW/PoS, who suffer from confirming 
time problem from several minutes to hours, Proof of Integrity uses round-robin or 
randomness as miner electing algorithm, because every miner has an unforgeable 
identity. This approach has a major advantage in that the block produced by a miner is 
finalized immediately, chain re-org is not required any more, long chain fork 
(consensuses in Bitcoin family) and uncle block (consensuses in Ethereum family) 
never happen. So, the blockchain state, e.g. account balance and smart contract result, 
can be retrieved and used at time when the latest block arrives. 
Round-robin is simple and effective. Every miner in the miner list produces a block at 
a certain sequence. Let m is a miner, and M is all miners set in the list,  
 
 m0, m1, …mi, …∈M 
 
We define the order of list as hash(mi) < hash (mi+1). 
At each round, a miner with index i is active and produces a block, where i is the 
index of a miner from the list, h is the round number (block height), and n is the total 
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miner amount in the list. 
 
i ← h MOD n 
 
Random is complex but more secure. The miner of next round is unpredictable until 
current round is determined. This makes DDoS targeted attacking is much difficult to 
be carried out, and reduces the opportunity of the miner’s speculation. Verifiable 
Random Functions (VRFs) [45] is a good approach to generate a random number 
among all of the blockchain nodes, each of them can verify the random number 
independently. For any input seed x, VRFsk(x) returns two values: a hash and a proof. 
The hash is a random value which is uniquely determined by sk and x. The proof π 
enables anyone who knows pk to verify the hash is generated from x, without having 
to know sk.  
 
x ← hashOfBlock (h – 1) 
<hash, π> ← VRFsk(x) 
i ← hash MOD n 
 
3.2.4 Mining 
Trusted Computing with Proof of Integrity protocol is an innovation to blockchain. 
The mining consensus is simplified that a miner shows its proof of integrity to other 
nodes and convinces them it is honest and not tampered. The detailed process is as 
following: 
1) A miner is elected as an active miner for the next round according to Miner 
Electing Method. 
2) The active miner produces a candidate block. This is similar to mining in other 
blockchain, including executing transactions, computing merkle root, generating 
block headers and packaging a final block, except that calculating difficulty is no 
longer required.  
3) The active miner quotes its integrity values and generates Attestation Quote. The 
Trusted Computing TPM uses quote command to retrieve these values together 
with a signature, ensuring they are not forged or tampered.  
4) The active miner composes the Attestation Quote and identity label into a final 
block, and then send the block out to all nodes in the blockchain network. Note 
that the identity certificate is no longer required since the certificate is known by 
other nodes (stored in the miner list) when Miner Join process completes. 
5) When a node gets this block, it verifies if the block is eligible and correct. First, it 
checks if the integrity values are in the Integrity List. Second, it verifies if the 
integrity values signature is truly signed with the miner’s identity. Last, it 
calculates the index i according to Miner Electing Method to determine if this 
miner is eligible. When all of the verifications pass, the node accepts the block.  
6) The integrity values and the signature (Attestation Quote) ensure the active miner 
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is honest and not tampered, subsequently, other node does not require to run the 
transactions any more. The active miner can put the transaction result into the 
block to allow Single Execution Model, as described in a later section. 
Proof of Integrity constrains two aspects, the identity and the integrity. The identity 
has one to one relationship with a miner’s hardware, and the integrity ensures the 
miner is honest and not tampered. The malicious miner, whose identity is not from a 
certified TPM or the integrity is not correct, will fail to join the blockchain network 
and cannot produce a valid block later.  
3.2.5 Compatible Protocols 
There would be more kinds of algorithm to elect the miner. [44] proposed 
RANDHOUND and RANDHERD for some certain degrees of distributed 
randomness used as node selection to generate block. A protocol used by a blockchain 
consensus is consistent in all nodes enforced by Proof of Integrity, malicious mining 
behaviors and tampered blocks from a dishonest node will be ignored and cannot 
break the security of the blockchain. 
3.3 Enhance the Efficiency of Blockchain 
3.3.1 Transaction 
Trusted Computing with Proof of Integrity in blockchain can reduce the transactions 
execution effort significantly. Each node will trust the transaction result executed by 
the honest miner who has already checked the correctness, e.g. signatures, amounts 
and balances, etc. In most cases, the miner who is responsible to execute the 
transaction and calculate the result is called executing node (executing node is a miner 
node, it’s used for representing execution purpose). The other node without executing 
transaction is called non-executing node. 
Figure 2 shows transaction execution flow. The executing node produces a block 
containing the transactions and results, and then broadcast to the network. The other 
nodes can trust the transactions results by checking the miner’s integrity. 
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Figure 2: Transaction Execution 
 
The efficiency of the transactions execution is higher, because the time complexity of 
executing transactions in a block is reduced from O(n) to O(1). The miner can 
produce a bigger block to increase the throughput without effort overhead in all nodes. 
Comparing to other blockchains who force transaction executions in every node, 
Truxen has outstanding effectiveness. 
3.3.2 Smart Contract 
Smart contract derives from the Bitcoin transaction script but is quite different in that 
it is Turing completed and is more powerful to do complicated business logic, as 
smart contract can be written in advanced language, like Golang, Java, Solidity, 
Serpent etc. Like transaction, executing smart contract is duplicated in each node, the 
result is calculated independently and then persisted into blockchain storage.  
Trusted Computing with Proof of Integrity makes the smart contract execution 
simplified. A executing node executes contracts in the meantime it produces a block, 
and involve the results in the block, then broadcast them to the network. When a node 
receives the block, it checks the integrity, and then persisted the results into 
blockchain storage.  
Only one executing node to execute the transactions and smart contracts in blockchain, 
is called Single Execution Model (SEM).  
3.3.3 Single Execution Model 
Single Execution Model is a unique feature of Truxen. Comparing to other 
blockchains, it is advanced in the features of determinacy, efficiency and off-chain 
invocation.  
In traditional smart contract, random number is not allowed because different nodes 
have different entropy sources or seeds, resulting in different result. However Single 
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Execution Model can safely generate random number within smart contract code that 
will not break the consensus. The random number can be used as nonce of signing, 
seed of a key, object identity and data grouping, etc. The Random Number Generator 
module in TPM is a best choice, as it has physical entropy source and is separated 
from the other parts of the system. The entropy sources are physically randomness, 
they could be the noises in the circuit, temperature of the chip, clock jitter and other 
type of physical events. The separation from other parts mitigates the security issues 
like seeds collision, comparison-based attack. 
Single Execution Model has potential high performance and efficiency, and can 
increase the blockchain throughput. It distributes the workload among all the miners, 
while others save the computing resource and can do more jobs. Note that Single 
Execution Model requires the block involves result of executing transaction and smart 
contract, that increases the block size and networking effort by 10%-20% 
approximately, but decreases the computing load by 90%. In busy time, the block is 
enlarged to contain more transactions, but the computing load is barely up, as shown 
in Figure 3.  
  
Figure 3: Block Size and Computing Load 
 
Blockchain does not enable off-chain invocation natively, because the invocation runs 
from every node in the network, that is impossible for the off-chain system to accept 
such kind of remote calls. But off-chain invocation is essentially helpful to business 
logic to retrieve data or notify events. [29] proposed a method to invoke the website 
interface inside a smart contract through the trusted hardware, and the response is 
trusted and tamper-resisted. On the other way, Oracle as a workaround allows the 
event trigger mechanism to send remote calls to off-chain applications, and gets 
responses as a separated input of smart contract. Single Execution Model is a 
state-of-the-art approach to natively support off-chain invocation as it prevents the 
duplicated outbound requests and inconsistency responses. Transactions and smart 
contracts inherently run on an executing node which will initiate the remote call to 
off-chain system and get response synchronously, while other nodes do not do it.  
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3.4 Protection for Sensitive Data 
The sensitive data, for example private keys, are critical to blockchain security, since 
they are the core ingredient of wallets or user identity. In most cases, the sensitive 
data are stored in file system which are prone to leak. Although the they could be 
protected by passcode, it is insufficient secure as the passcode could be weak and 
suffer from dictionary attack. 
In Bitcoin, there is a kind of wallet which is a dedicated hardware and can generate 
and store private keys. The hardware wallet is the safest wallet because the private 
keys never leave the hardware. Similarly, in Trusted Computing, there is a Protected 
Location which can be used to store the sensitive data confidentially. The sensitive 
data is encrypted inside Trusted Platform Module and stored in its non-volatile 
memory. The encryption uses seed and key that never leave the platform, therefore 
there is no way to leak data. 
The private key can be derived from Endorsement Key as seed, like deterministic 
wallet in Bitcoin, and it could be restored within the same hardware in case of lost. 
While other hardware cannot derive the same key as the seed is different. The 
alternative key generation is through Random Number Generator in TPM, and the key 
must be stored securely in Protected Location. 
3.5 Network Topology 
The nodes without Trusted Computing can collaborate in the blockchain network as 
well. So, there are two types of nodes, node with Trusted Computing and node 
without. Different nodes play different roles. Figure 4 shows the mixed nodes in the 
network. 
 
 
Figure 4: Mixed nodes in Truxen topology  
 
The jobs processed by trusted nodes only are: generating blocks, quoting the integrity 
values, executing the transactions or smart contracts and calculating results. These 
actions need Trusted Computing to resist adversaries, Sybil attack, double spending, 
spamming transactions, malicious code, majority attack, etc. The consensus is 
initiated from trusted nodes, which play major role int blockchain to keep secure and 
consistent. The jobs processed by both types of nodes include sending transactions, 
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holding blockchain storage, propagating the transactions and blocks, updating storage 
and checking integrity of the block. The untrusted nodes are usually used to relay 
transactions, inquire the transactions data and account balance.  
 
 
Figure 5: Relations between trusted node and untrusted node  
4. RELATED WORK 
Trusted Computing plays an important role in the context of blockchains. Several 
related papers and projects are presented for different purposes from data privacy, 
transaction security, and block producing algorithm. The domains they are trying to 
resolve reflects what the blockchain lacks of and what is evolving rapidly.  
Hyperledger Sawtooth is using Intel SGX as a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE). 
It composes the block producing algorithm inside the TEE which is running on Intel 
CPU. Sawtooth uses a Proof of Elapsed Time (PoET) consensus that allows all miners 
of the blockchain to wait a randomized time at each of mining round, and the one 
whose waiting time is shortest wins the round, and then is eligible to produce a block. 
Sawtooth verifies the miner’s legitimacy with Intel’s IAS service and determines if a 
miner has been truly waited the amount of time it claims. The codes in Proof of 
Elapsed Time consensus must be separated from the other parts of blockchain as the 
consensus module is running inside TEE which uses a different development policies 
and tools.  
Proof of Luck blockchain is built upon TEE. It consists of two functions PoLROUND 
and PoLMINE. At each of mining round, the node calls PoLROUND to get a round 
time. The shortest round time means a luckier number, and will enable the node to 
produce a block. Function PoLMINE prepares a block with previous block hash, and 
ensures the round time passes before the block is sent out. An attestation is sent to 
remote nodes at the meantime that allows the nodes to validate the correctness. A 
monotonic counter is setup in PoLMINE to prohibit concurrent invocations of the 
TEE. 
Ekiden [46] is a confidentiality-preserving, trustworthy platform, it can offload smart 
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contract execution from blockchain to TEE and perform data encryption. Ekiden can 
perform thousands of transactions per second due to the effective combination of 
blockchains and trusted hardware. Ekiden uses a so-called compute nodes as smart 
contract execution and attests the result on chain. Besides compute nodes, there are 
consensus nodes which maintain the blockchain ledger and do not require the TEE 
capability. Ekiden uses opensource RISC-V project Keystone [47] as the TEE 
runtime. 
IBM Research proposed a TEE based hyperledger fabric solution [48]. They are using 
SGX enclaves to execute chaincode, maintain ledger and registry. Chaincode will be 
executed in Chaincode Enclave after remote attestation is performed and verified. 
And the state data are stored into ledge in a separated Ledger Enclave. The state data 
and chaincode operation can be encrypted using PKcc and decrypted using SKcc 
inside the enclave, which keeps the transaction and data secret from other peers. 
Proof of Authority consensus is deployed in Ethereum Rinkeby test net. It assigns 
every miner an identity and chooses the miner to produce a block according to the 
identity, less computationally intensive than PoW approaches. When a new miner is 
joining the blockchain, existing miners will vote for it, major part of their decisions 
will determine the joining permission.  
Oracle provides some abilities to interact with off-chain applications. Oracle is an 
off-chain agent that continually reads the events of blockchain transactions log and 
invokes the remote interface if certain conditions are met. Oracle usually is an 
asynchronized process, requesting and responding are in different threads, and it’s the 
smart contract responsibility to check the response correctness and trustworthiness. 
Town Crier [49] uses TEE as an Oracle to retrieve the data feed for smart contract 
from outside system, which simplified the verification of remote response.  
5. CONCLUSION 
Trusted Computing enhanced blockchain simplified the consensus implementation, 
and it can increase the efficiency in transaction and smart contract execution, as well 
as makes blockchain more secure with encrypted protection. Additionally, it has the 
ability to invoke off-chain system, that makes blockchain more flexible and adoptable. 
Finally, it has in-deterministic capability that allows some degree of randomized logic 
in smart contract code.  
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